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I. INTRODUCTION
Few legal doctrines have had greater impact upon product li-
ability litigation during the last decade than the federal preemp-
tion defense. In essence, Congress and federal administrative
agencies have immunized manufacturers of a wide assortment of
federally-regulated products, including pesticides, medical devices,
adhesives and solvents intended for consumer use, animal vaccines,
lawn mowers and many others, against many forms of tort liability
imposed under state law. Where the preemption defense lies, ex-
tensive pretrial discovery, expensive expert witnesses, and judges
and jurors sympathetic to the local accident victim and hostile to
the unfeeling corporate behemoth seldom make an appearance.
Even the most grievously injured plaintiff may find himself de-
prived of any legal remedy for his injuries due to declarations of
exclusivity of federal law issued by Congress and federal agencies.
Not surprisingly, advocates and opponents of federal preemp-
tion of state tort claims have waged pitched battles within all three
branches of government. What may be somewhat surprising, how-
ever, is the degree of disharmony among federal and state courts,
Congress, and federal agencies on the issue. Without seeming
rhyme or reason, state tort claims involving some products, but not
others, may be preempted; some federal agencies favor limiting
state tort remedies, while others do not; and, even Congress can be
torn by notions of federalism and states' rights on the one hand,
and the growing trend toward national (as well as global) uniform-
ity. As a result, the current state of the law regarding federal pre-
emption of state law product liability actions is confusing and cha-
otic.
This article focuses upon the evolution of the federal preemp-
tion defense in product liability actions and, thereafter, upon spe-
cific instances where Congress or federal agencies have declared
state tort law to be totally or partially preempted and the courts'
treatment of those declarations. We offer our views on the factors
which have caused the courts to arrive at such disparate results in
these cases. Finally, we offer a brief, but hopefully informed, look
as to what the future might hold for the preemption defense.
[Vol. 27:1
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II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION GENERALLY
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution' de-
clares "the Laws of the United States" to be "the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding." From the Supremacy Clause springs the concept of
federal preemption, i.e., the invalidity of those state laws which con-
flict with federal law.
2
Federal preemption comes in three different "flavors'' _ "ex-
4press," "implied,"or "conflict" preemption. These differ from one
another primarily in the manner by which the preemptive effect of
federal law is determined.
Express preemption-far and away the most significant flavor
of preemption in state product liability actions-arises either where
Congress has explicitly declared federal legislation to have preemp-
tive effect, 5 or where a federal agency, acting within the scope of
authority conferred upon it b y Congress, has expressly declared an
intent to preempt state law. Where Congress has acted to ex-
pressly preempt state law, identification of "the domain expressly
preempted" is central to the task of determining the scope of pre-
emption.' Both the plain language of the allegedly preempting
statute and an understanding of the congressional purpose sup-
porting the statute are vital to a preemption inquiry." Put another
way, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed, " [t] he purpose
of Congress is the ultimate touchstone" in express preemption
9
cases.
1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
2. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819). See also New
York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 654 (1995) (recognizing the Supremacy Clause may entail pre-emption
of state law).
3. Kinley Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 999 F.2d 354, 358 n.3 (8th Cir. 1993).
4. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. at 650 (discussing the three forms of federal
preemption).
5. E.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516-17 (1992).
6. E.g., City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 65 (1988); Capital Cities Cable,
Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-99 (1984); Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 149-50 (1982).
7. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
8. E.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996); Gade v. Nat'l Solid
Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992).
9. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S.
2000]
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Where a federal agency has acted to expressly preempt state
law, the inquiry is somewhat different. Unlike Congress, federal
agencies can address a subject through various means, including
regulations, preambles to regulations, interpretive statements, and
responses to comments. Each of these types of pronouncements
may have preemptive effect, so long as two conditions are met: (1)
the agency must have intended to displace state law, and (2) the
agency acted within the scope of its congressionally-delegated au-
thority.'0 Importantly, however, an express congressional declara-
tion of preemptive intent is not required." So long as a federal
agency's decision to preempt state law "represents a reasonable ac-
commodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the
agency's care by statute, [a reviewing court] should not disturb it
unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the
accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.
' 2
Principles of implied and direct conflict preemption may also
impact state product liability actions." Implied preemption arises
where neither Congress nor a federal agency has expressly declared
an intent to preempt state law, but nonetheless "federal law so
thoroughly occupies a legislative field 'as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement
it."' 14 Thus, federal legislation acts implicitly as a barrier to state
regulation. 5 Conflict preemption arises, again absent an express or
implied declaration of Congress' or an agency's intent, when "com-
pliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impos-
sibility,"'16 or when state law "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."'
7
96, 103 (1963). Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978); Cipollone,
505 U.S. at 516; Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485.
10. Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
718 (1985); de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153-54; FCC, 486 U.S. at 64.
11. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154; FCC, 486 U.S. at 64.
12. United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961); City of New York v. FCC,
486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988).
13. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., - U.S._, 120 S. Ct. 1913
(2000), discussed in greater detail infra note 20 and accompanying text.
14. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
15. E.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
16. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963).
17. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
[Vol. 27:1
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Particularly in the context of matters of public health and
safety, federal preemption of state law runs headlong against the
states' traditional prominence in protecting the health, safety and
property of their citizens." The tension between federal preemp-
tion and the exercise of historic state police powers is reconciled, at
least in part, by a presumption against federal preemption. 9
Though most often invoked in actions involving implied or conflict• 20
preemption, the presumption against preemption also attaches to
express preemption cases.
III. EXPRESS FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE PRODUCT LIABILITY
LIABILITY ACTIONS GENERALLY
Prior to 1992, federal preemption of product liability actions
brought under state statutes or common law was essentially non-
existent. In an oft-cited case, for instance, the District of Columbia
Circuit held that a federal statute which prevents states from impos-
ing "requirements" different from or in addition to those imposed
by federal law upon a given product did not reach common-law tort
22claims. Moreover, in an action involving personal injury allegedly
caused by exposure to nuclear radiation, the United States Su-
preme Court held that Congress' grant of federal exclusivity over
matters of nuclear safety did not preclude states from indirectly
regulating nuclear safety through tort liability.2,
The early 90's saw a significant change in preemption. In
1992, in the Supreme Court held that certain state law failure-to-
warn claims arising out of the sale of cigarettes were preempted by
18. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996).
19. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 484. By contrast, the Supreme
Court has recently observed that the presumption against preemption "is not trig-
gered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of sig-
nificant federal presence." United States v. Locke, - U.S. -_, 120 S.Ct. 1135,
1147 (2000).
20. E.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984). However, the
Supreme Court's recent decision and opinion in Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
Inc., - U.S. , 120 S. Ct. 1913 (2000) casts some doubt on the continuing validity
of the presumption against preemption in conflict preemption cases.
21. Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
715-16 (1985); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 484.
22. Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (constru-
ing the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act's preemption clause, 7
U.S.C. § 136v(b)).
23. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 238.
200]
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federal law.24 Cipollone was an action for wrongful death allegedly
caused by cigarette smoking. Plaintiff sought damages from ciga-
rette manufacturers pursuant to New Jersey product liability stat-
utes and common-law doctrines, including failure to warn, breach
of express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspir-
acy.15 Defendants argued that plaintiffs claims were preempted by
section 5(b) of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
of 1965, as amended by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969. 26 The 1965 version of the statute prohibited states from re-
quiring "[any] statement relating to smoking and health ... in the
advertising of any cigarettes which packages are labeled in confor-
mity with the provisions of this chapter.' Four years later, Con-
gress amended § 5(b) to bar states from imposing via state law
"[any] requirement or prohibition based upon smoking and
health.. .with respect to the advertising or promotion of any ciga-
rettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the
provisions of this chapter.,
28
The initial question confronted by the Supreme Court was
whether either statute was broad enough to preempt not just state
regulation of cigarette labeling, but also state common-law dam-
ages actions. Construing both statutes in light of the presumption
against preemption, the Supreme Court determined that the 1965
act, barring states merely from requiring "statements" relating to
smoking and health, did not preempt any damages claims arising
out of cigarette smoking; however, the 1969 act, which prevented
states from imposing any "requirement or prohibition" relating to
smoking, was held to preempt state common-law damages actions
291as well as state regulation of cigarette labeling.
Given the Supreme Court's holding that the "no requirement
or prohibition" language in the 1969 act extended to requirements
and prohibitions imposed by New Jersey common law, the remain-
ing question was whether the 1969 act blocked all, or only a por-
tion, of the plaintiffs claims. The "central inquiry," according to
the Supreme Court, was "whether the legal duty that is the predi-
24. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530-31 (1992).
25. Id.. at 508.
26. Id. at 510; 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
28. Id.
29. Cippolone, 505 U.S. at 518-20 (1965 act), 520-23 (1969 act).
[Vol. 27:1
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cate of the common-law damages action constitutes a 'requirement
or prohibition based on smoking and health.. .imposed under State
law with respect to... advertising or promotion,' giving that clause a
fair but narrow reading."3 ° The Supreme Court determined that
plaintiffs failure-to-warn and fraudulent misrepresentation claims,
to the extent they would have imposed upon cigarette manufactur-
ers the obligation to include warnings on their packaging beyond
those approved by the federal government, fell within the scope of
§ 5(b) of the 1969 act and were therefore preempted. 3' However,
claims unrelated to the "advertising or promotion" of cigarettes, in-
cluding ones premised upon defendants' testing of and research
into the health effects of cigarette smoking, were held not to be
preempted,32 as were claims which did not rest upon a specific duty
imposed by state law, for example, plaintiffs claims for breach of
express warranties which the Supreme Court interpreted as duties
voluntarily assumed by the defendants. 33
Four years later, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
federal preemption of state common-law damages actions arising
34
out of use of federally-regulated medical devices. Plaintiff con-
tended she was injured by defendant's allegedly defective pace-
maker, which was approved for marketing by the Food and Drug
Administration pursuant to section 510(k) of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act.: 5 A preemption clause inserted by Con-
gress into the act in 1976 prohibited states from "establish [ing] or
continu[ing] in effect... any requirement - (1) which is different
from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this
chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effec-
tiveness of the device....,, 6 A majority ofjustices held that the term
"requirement" contained within the preemption statute encom-
passed not just state positive enactments, but also legal require-
ments arising from the application of state common law.37 How-
30. Id. at 523-24.
31. Id. at 524.
32. Id. at 524-25.
33. Id. at 525-27.
34. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
35. Id. at 480-81; 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b) (1) (A) (2000) (referring to class III de-
vices).
36. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2000).
37. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 508-09 (O'Connor, J.,joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and
Scalia and Thomas, JJ.) and at 504 (Breyer, J.).
2000]
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ever, the Supreme Court, upon a variety of other grounds, ulti-
mately held that none of the plaintiffs claims were preempted by
the federal statute.38
Most recently, the Supreme Court addressed the degree to
which federal motor vehicle safety law may preempt state product
liability actions based upon defective automobile design .3 Plaintiff
was injured while driving a 1987 automobile which did not have a
driver's side airbag and sued the vehicle's manufacturer for her in-
juries, claiming that the absence of an airbag rendered the vehicle
defective and unreasonably dangerous. Under regulations prom-
ulgated in 1984 by the Department of Transportation pursuant to
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,40 vehicle
manufacturers were required to equip a minimum of 10% of their
1987 model year cars with passive restraint devices - either airbags
41
or automatic seatbelts. Where a federally-promulgated motor ve-
hicle safety standard is in effect, the Act preempts state establish-
ment or enforcement of "any safety standard applicable to the same
aspect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which
is not identical to the Federal standard. '42 However, a separate
"savings clause" in the Act provides that "[c]ompliance with any
Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter
does not exempt any person from any liability under common
law. "4
Relying heavily upon the savings clause, the Supreme Court in
Geier held that the preemption clause in the act did not expressly
bar plaintiffs defective design claims. According to the Court, the
presence of the savings clause indicated that Congress did not in-
tend the preemption clause to broadly bar state common-law prod-
uct liability actions; otherwise, there would be little if any "liability
at common law" to save in the first place.44 However, the Court de-
38. Medtronic infra pp. 22-25 in connection with preemption under the Medi-
cal Device Amendments of 1976.
39. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 1913 (2000).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1381, recodified without substantive change at 49 U.S.C. §
30301.
41. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208; see also the discussion infra note 75 and accompany-
ing text.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d), recodified without substantive change at 49 U.S.C. §
30103(b) (1).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k), recodified without substantive change at 49 U.S.C. §
30103(e).
44. The majority declined to reach the question of whether "safety stan-
[Vol. 27:1
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termined that the savings clause does not foreclose or limit the op-
eration of other preemption principles, particularly implied and
conflict preemption. 5 Applying principles of conflict preemption,
the Court found that plaintiffs "no airbag" claim did directly con-
flict with the Department of Transportation's 1984 safety standard
and was therefore preempted on that basis.
Taken together, Cipollone, Medtronic and Geier establish a rea-
sonably clear framework for evaluating whether state law product
liability actions will be deemed to be expressly preempted, in whole
or in part, by federal law. First, in most cases a federal statute or an
authorized regulation or other declaration from a federal agency,
setting forth Congress' or the agency's express preemptive intent,
must exist. Although Geier illustrates that implied or conflict pre-
emption of state law product liability actions is possible, Geier re-
mains the exception, not the rule.4 Second, the specific preempt-
ing language must be broad enough to encompass both state
positive enactments and duties imposed by state common-law dam-
ages actions. The focus must be upon the specific statutory or
regulatory language used by Congress or the agency, and legislative
or administrative history illustrating the scope of Congress' or the
agency's preemptive intent. Third, in light of Geier, the act must, in
all likelihood, be devoid of a savings clause preserving common-law
remedies. Finally, the subject-matter of the state law claim must
fairly fall within the scope of the federal enactment. Where each of
these conditions is satisfied, preemption of state law product liabil-
ity claims arising from harm caused by an allegedly defective prod-
dards," viewed without regard to the savings clause, is sufficiently broad to encom-
pass state tort claims. Cf Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530-31 (1992) (holding that "requirements" is
sufficiently broad). Geier, 120 S. Ct. at 1918. By contrast, the dissent concluded
that the phrase "safety standard" "refers to an objective rule prescribed by a legisla-
ture or an administrative agency and does not encompass case-specific decisions by
judges and juries that resolve common-law claims." Id. at 1933 (StevensJ., dissent-
ing).
45. Id. at 1919.
46. Id. at 1922.
47. Geier notwithstanding, neither "implied" nor "conflict" preemption ordi-
narily prohibits states from imposing upon a product manufacturer requirements
more stringent than those which may be required by federal law, absent a situation
where the plaintiff alleges that state common law obligated a product manufac-
turer to design or manufacture a product in a manner expressly prohibited by ap-
plicable federal regulations. Id. at 1931 n.6 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Such
cases are extremely few and far between.
2000]
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uct may lie. Absent enactment of master federal legislation appli-
cable to all state products actions, however,48 Cipollone and Medtronic
illustrate that the preemption question can only be addressed on a
product-by-product, statute-by-statute basis.
IV. SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF PREMPTION OF STATE PRODUCT
LIABILITY CLAIMS
In a variety of categories of allegedly defective products, de-
fendants have urged that federal law expressly preempts state law
product liability claims. The most significant statutory and regula-
tory schemes, and the courts' treatment of the preemption issue in
each, are recounted below.
A. Pesticides
Pesticides (including insecticides, fungicides, herbicides and
rodenticides) are regulated by the Environmental Protection
Agency under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act ("FIFRA") .9 Among other things, FIFRA mandates that all pes-
ticides sold in the United States must be registered for use by the
EPA, and that the content of all product labels and inserts must be
supported by test data and specifically approved by EPA before the
product may be sold. ° An express preemption clause in FIFRA
prohibits states from "impos[ing] or continu[ing] in effect any re-
quirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different
from those required [by the EPA under FIFRA] ."5
The several United States Courts of Appeals which have ad-
dressed the question have uniformly held that FIFRA's express pre-
emption clause bars state tort failure-to-warn claims, whether
sounding in strict liability or negligence, which would in net effect
impose labeling requirements "different from or in addition to" the
48. In recent years, several bills have been introduced in Congress which
would have generally federalized most product liability law by preempting most
forms of state statutory and common law pertaining to product liability actions.
E.g., H.R. 1910, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., § 2; H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess., § 102;
S. 2236, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., § 102. None of these bills was ever enacted into
law.
49. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a, 136v(b) (1999).
50. Id. § 136a.
51. Id. § 136v(b).
[Voi. 27:1
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content of a pesticide's EPA-approved label.52 In addition, most
courts have applied FIFRA's preemption clause to bar claims based
upon breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, or
misrepresentation where the claim is in essence a challenge to the
EPA-approved label. 53  However, the courts have uniformly held
that claims premised upon design or manufacturing defect, or
upon negligence in the design or manufacture of a pesticide, are
not preempted insofar as those claims do not implicate require-
ments for "labeling or packaging" of pesticides. State courts have
reached essentially similar results.
B. Medical Devices
Medical devices, including such diverse items as pacemakers,
orthopedic implants, tampons and heart catheters, are subject to
regulation by the Food and Drug Administration under the Medi-
cal Device Amendments of 1976 ("MDA") to the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act. 56 The MDA obligates the FDA, through a
pre-market review and approval process, to evaluate and approveS 57
the safety and efficacy of all medical devices. The degree of pre-
market review given by the FDA to medical devices is dependent
primarily upon the degree of potential risk to human health pre-
sented by the device; those devices presenting the greatest risk un-
52. Grenier v. Vermont Log Bldgs., Inc., 96 F.3d 559, 563 (1st Cir. 1996);
Welchert v. Am. Cyanamid, Inc., 59 F.3d 69, 71 (8th Cir. 1995); Taylor AG Indus.
v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555, 560-61 (9th Cir. 1995); Bice v. Leslie's Poolmart, Inc., 39
F.3d 887, 888 (8th Cir. 1994); MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021, 1025
(5th Cir. 1994); Worm v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744, 748 (4th Cir. 1993); King
v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346, 1349 (1st Cir. 1993); Shaw v.
Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 371 (7th Cir. 1993); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d
516, 520 (11th Cir. 1993); Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters &
Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 1993).
53. Grenier, 96 F.3d at 563; Taylor AG Indus., 54 F.3d at 560-61; Papas, 985 F.2d
at 520; Lescs v. Dow Chem. Co., 976 F.Supp. 393, 397-98 (W.D. Va.).
54. Papas, 985 F.2d at 520.
55. See, e.g., Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Service, Inc., 993 P.2d 366, 366-67 (Cal.
2000); Ackerman v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 586 N.W.2d 208, 215-16 (Iowa 1998); Ack-
les v. Luttrell, 561 N.W.2d 573, 576-79 (Neb. 1997); Lewis v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,
715 A.2d 967, 972-75 (NJ. 1998); Tyler v. Dow Chemical Co., Inc., 683 N.Y.S.2d
619, 620-21 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Didier v. Drexel Chem. Co., 938 P.2d 364, 365-
70 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). Cf Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agric. Products, 948
P.2d 1055, 1074-81 (Haw. 1997); Brown v. Chas. H. Lilly Co., 985 P.2d 846, 848-53
(Or. Ct. App. 1999).
56. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1999).
57. Id. § 360e(d)(2).
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dergo the greatest pre-market scrutiny.58 However, medical devices
deemed to be "substantially equivalent" to devices already on the
market in 19 7 6 59are subject to a far less stringent standard of FDA
review; such devices are commonly referred to as "[section] 510(k)"
devices. 6° The MDA also provides that "no State or political subdi-
vision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a
device intended for human use any requirement (1) which is dif-
ferent from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under
this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or ef-
fectiveness of the device....
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Medtronic, most
courts addressing the issue held that the MDA's preemption clause
barred state tort actions seeking, in net effect, the imposition of du-
ties "different from or in addition to" those imposed by the FDA
upon a medical device, regardless of whether the device underwent
full pre-market review and approval or was approved through the §
62510(k) process. In Medtronic, however, an action involving an al-
legedly defective pacemaker approved by the FDA via § 510(k), the
Supreme Court held that state tort claims for defective design and
manufacture, failure-to-warn, and noncompliance with federal
standards were not preempted. As to the design defect claims, all
nine justices agreed that, as a section 510(k)-marketed device, the
pacemaker was not subjected to any FDA design review, but was
merely found by the FDA to be "substantially equivalent" to unre-
viewed devices on the market in 1976. Hence, for the purposes of
the MDA's preemption clause, no "requirement" as to the pace-
maker's design had been established by the FDA, and the plaintiff
therefore could not seek a requirement "different from or in addi-
58. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A)-(C).
59. A "grandfather" clause in the MDA allows medical devices already in exis-
tence when the MDA was enacted to remain on the market without FDA approval
until the FDA initiates and completes the pre-market approval process for such
devices. Id. § 360e(b)(1)(A).
60. The designation refers to the section of the MDA establishing the "sub-
stantially equivalent" means of regulatory approval. Id. § 360e (b) (1) (B).
61. Id. § 360k(a).
62. Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1268, 1275 (7th Cir. 1995); Duvall v.
Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 65 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 1995); Martello v. Ciba Vision
Corp., 42 F.3d 1167, 1168 (8th Cir. 1994); Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d
540, 542 (3rd Cir. 1994); Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1994).
But cf Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that MDA does not preempt common law tort claims).
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tion to" a requirement which did not exist.63 A unanimous Court
also agreed that tort claims for noncompliance with federal stan-
dards were not preempted; to the extent plaintiff merely sought to
enforce federal law, she did not seek to impose requirements "dif-
ferent from or in addition to" those imposed by the FDA. Finally,
as to the plaintiffs manufacturing and labeling defect claims, a ma-
jority ofJustices relied upon an FDA interpretive regulation provid-
ing in pertinent part that the MDA preempts state law "only when
the [FDA] has established specific counterpart regulations or there
are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device
under the [MDA]," and that "State or local requirements of general
65applicability" were not preempted. According to the majority, the
plaintiffs common-law tort theories were not developed "with re-
spect to" medical devices but were "requirements of general appli-
cability" to all products, not just medical devices, and therefore
were not preempted. 66
Post-Medtronic decisions interpreting the scope of preemption
under the MDA reach generally inconsistent results. About the
only consistency shown among the courts is that, where the alleg-
edly defective product is a section 510(k) device, state common-law
tort theories are not preempted. 6' Some courts have held that
product liability claims involving so-called "IDE" devices,68 which
undergo a greater level of agency scrutiny than section 510(k) de-
vices, are preempted under the MDA, Medtronic notwithstanding. 69
The Ninth Circuit has held that, where FDA standards specify the
content for a warning label, state failure-to-warn claims, though ar-
guably of "general applicability," are nonetheless preempted.70
Conversely, the Tenth Circuit has held that common-law failure-to-
63. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 492, 513 (1996).
64. Id. at 507.
65. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (2000).
66. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 500 (Stevens, J.). The dissent declined to give def-
erence to the FDA's interpretive regulation and concluded that the plain language
of the MDA barred plaintiffs manufacturing and labeling defect claims. Id. at 513
(O'Connor, J. concurring).
67. Reeves v. Acromed Corp., 103 F.3d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 1997).
68. "IDE" refers to an exemption to the full pre-market review and approval
process for "investigational devices" permitted under the MDA, 21 U.S.C. §
360j (g).
69. Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782, 785 (10th Cir. 1997); Chambers v.
Osteonics Corp., 109 F.3d 1243, 1248 (7th Cir. 1997); Martin v. Telectronics Pac-
ing Sys., Inc., 105 F.3d 1090, 1093 (6th Cir. 1997).
70. Papike v. Tambrands, Inc., 107 F.3d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 1997).
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warn claims are not developed "with respect to" the device at issue
and are therefore not preempted. 7' Finally, the Eleventh Circuit
recently ruled that no preemption exists whatsoever for tort claims
involving a pacemaker undergoing full pre-market review and ap-
proval because the premarket approval process did not amount to a
"specific federal requirement" within the meaning of the FDA's in-
terpretive regulation;7 2 however, the Seventh Circuit reached theS 73
opposite conclusion. To suggest that post-Medtronic case law re-garding MDA preemption is muddled is an understatement.4
C. Motor Vehicles
Much product liability litigation involving this act has focused
on Safety Standard 208, the regulation at issue in Geier. As promul-
gated in 1984, Standard 208 required automobile manufacturers to
install passive restraints - driver-side airbags or automatic seat belts
- in some, but not all, automobiles made between 1986 and 1989.
75
Manufacturers faced with design defect claims brought by injured
drivers or occupants of such vehicles, based generally upon the lack
of airbag protection, have contended that such claims are pre-
empted under the act as ones which would impose requirements
"not identical to" Standard 208.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Geier, the courts were
badly fractured on the subject. Several federal appeals courts con-
cluded that such claims are either expressly or implicitly pre-
;76empted;. however, state appellate courts, relying upon the act's sav-
71. Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., III F.3d 782, 785,793 (10th Cir. 1997).
72. Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367, 1376 (l1th Cir. 1999).
73. Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 904 (7th Cir. 1997).
74. In light of the conflicting results reached by courts applying Medtronic to
cases involving IDE and full pre-market approval devices, on December 12, 1997,
the FDA issued a proposed rule for the purpose of "clarify[ing] and codify[ing]
the agency's longstanding position that available legal remedies, including State
common law tort claims, generally are not preempted under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act" for any medical device. 62 Fed. Reg. 65384 (1997). The
FDA subsequently withdrew the proposed rule on July 24, 1998. 63 Fed. Reg.
39789 (1998).
75. The rule required manufacturers to incorporate passive restraint devices
in 10% of their 1987 model year cars, 25% of their 1988 models, and 40% of their
1989 models. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208. All passenger cars manufactured after Septem-
ber 1, 1989 were required to incorporate passive restraints; those manufactured
after September 1, 1997 must provide specific airbag protection for the driver and
right front passenger. Id.
76. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 166 F.3d 1236, 1237 (D.C. Cir.
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ings clause, generally reached the opposite conclusion. 77 That split
has now been resolved by Geier, as discussed previously.
In one other notable decision involving preemption under the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, the United States
Supreme Court held that a safety standard regarding stopping dis-
tances for tractor-trailers promulgated by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, but subsequently suspended by a
federal appeals court, did not preempt state common-law claims for
78design defect arising out of the absence of antilock brakes. In the
absence of an enforceable federal standard, according to the Su-
preme Court, the act's preemption clause did not apply.
D. Watercraft
The Federal Boat Safety Act8° authorizes the United States
Coast Guard to establish safety standards for recreational boats.8' A
broad preemption clause in the act prohibits states from "estab-
lish [ing], continu [ing] in effect, or enforc [ing] a law or regulation
establishing a recreational vessel or associated equipment perform-
ance or other safety standard or imposing a requirement for associ-
ated equipment...that is not identical to a regulation prescribed
[by the Coast Guard under the act] .,,82 However, the act also con-
tains a savings clause which provides that compliance with federal
standards does not relieve anyone from liability at common law or
under State law. 3
During 1990, the Coast Guard considered, but ultimately re-
jected, proposed regulations which would have required marine
84manufacturers to incorporate propeller guards on their boats. In
1999); Irving v. Mazda Motor Corp., 136 F.3d 764, 766 (11th Cir. 1998); Harris v.
Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1997); Montag v. Honda Motor Co.,
Ltd., 75 F.3d 1414, 1417 (10th Cir. 1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902 F.2d
1116, 1118 (3rd Cir. 1990); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th
Cir. 1989); Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 401 (1st Cir. 1988).
77. See, e.g., Munroe v. Galati, 938 P.2d 1114 (Ariz. 1997); Tebbetts v. Ford
Motor Co., 665 A.2d 345 (N.H. 1995); Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp., 699 N.E.2d
376 (N.Y. 1998).
78. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 283, 289 (1995).
79. Id. at 286.
80. 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301, 4302, 4311 (2000).
81. Id. § 4302(a)(1).
82. Id. § 4306.
83. Id. § 4311(g).
84. Carstenson v. Brunswick Corp., 49 F.3d 430, 431 (8th Cir. 1995).
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design defect cases involving claims for personal injury due to the
absence of such a guard, manufacturers have sought refuge within
the act's preemption clause. Once again, the courts have reached
inconsistent results. Federal courts have generally concluded that
such claims are preempted. 85 While some state courts have also
ruled in favor of preemption,86 others have held that such claims
87are not preempted.
E. Animal Vaccines
Unlike the preceding examples, preemption of state product
liability actions involving animal vaccines is a product of agency,
not congressional, action. In the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act," Con-
gress gave broad authority to the Department of Agriculture to
regulate the design, manufacture, testing, and distribution of ani-
89
mal vaccines to ensure their safety, efficacy, potency and purity.
Congress amended the act in 1985 to confer even more discretion-
ary authority upon the agency and declared that federal control
was "necessary to prevent and eliminate burdens on commerce and
to effectively regulate such commerce."90 The legislative history of
the 1985 amendments reflects Congress' intent to establish "uni-
form national standards" for all animal vaccines marketed in the
United States. 9' However, Congress did not insert a preemption
clause into the act.
In 1992, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
("APHIS"), the arm of the Department of Agriculture charged with
85. Lewis v. Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494 (llth Cir. 1997); Carstensen, 49
F.2d at 431-32; Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574, 1580 (N.D. Ga. 1993);
Shield v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 822 F.Supp. 81, 84 (D. Conn. 1993); Shields v.
Outboard Marine Corp., Div. of Brunswick Corp., 776 F.Supp. 1579, 1581 (M.D.
Ga. 1991); Mowery v. Mercury Marine, 773 F. Supp. 1012, 1014-15 (N.D. Ohio
1991). All of these decisions, of course, were rendered before Geier, whether Geier
alters the analysis remains to be seen.
86. Farner v. Brunswick Corp., 607 N.E.2d 562, 567 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
87. Rubin v. Brutus Corp., 487 So.2d 360, 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986);
Moore v. Brunswick Bowling and Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Tex.
1994); Ramsey v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 623, 637-38 (Tex. App. 1993);
Mulhern v. Outboard Marine Corp., 432 N.W.2d 130, 134-36 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
88. 21 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (1999).
89. Id. § 154; See also Symens v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 152 F.3d 1050,
1053-54 (8th Cir. 1998).
90. 21 U.S.C. § 159 (1999).
91. S. Rep. No. 99-145, at 338-39 (1985); Lynnbrook Farms v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 79 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 1996).
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regulating animal vaccines, promulgated a final rule delineating
the extent to which states may regulate animal vaccines within theirS 92
boundaries. The rule, as well, contains no express preemption
clause. In its preamble to the final rule, however, APHIS disagreed
with comments suggesting that states should have the authority to
add to federal standards and declared that "States are not free to
impose requirements which are different from, or in addition to,
those imposed by USDA regarding the safety, efficacy, potency or• . • ,,193
purity of [an animal vaccine] . APHIS further announced in the
preamble that "where safety, efficacy, purity, and potency of bio-
logical products are concerned, it is the agency's intent to occupy
the field."9
In reliance upon these agency pronouncements, both federal
and state courts have consistently held that state product liability
claims for harm to animals caused by allegedly defective animal
vaccines are preempted insofar as those claims would effectively
impose upon the manufacturer requirements "different from or in
addition to" those imposed by APHIS.-' However, tort claims based
upon noncompliance with federal requirements have been found
not to be preempted. 96 Tort claims for human injury purportedly
caused by accidental exposure to animal vaccines have also been
held not to be preempted on the grounds that APHIS' congres-
sionally-delegated authority to preempt extended only to claims in-
volving animal harm.97
F Hazardous Substances Intended For Consumer Use
In the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, Congress authorized
the Consumer Products Safety Commission to establish mandatory
92. 9 C.F.R. § 102.5 (2000).
93. Viruses, Serums and Toxins and Analogous Products: Restrictions on Dis-
tribution and Use, 57 Fed. Reg. 38758, 38759 (1992).
94. Id.
95. Symens v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 152 F.3d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir.
1998); Lynnbrook Farms, 79 F.3d at 623; Gresham v. Boehringer Ingelheim Animal
Health, Inc., No.CIV.1:95-CV-3376-ODE, 1996 WL 751126, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 7,
1996); Murphy v. SmithKline Beecham Animal Health Group, 898 F.Supp. 811,
816 (D. Kan. 1995); Brandt v. Marshall Animal Clinic, 540 N.W.2d 870, 876 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1995).
96. Gresham, 1996 WL 751126, at *3; Silvey v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 976 S.W.2d
497, 500 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
97. Garrelts v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 943 F.Supp. 1023, 1063 (N.D.
Iowa 1996).
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labeling requirements for certain hazardous substances intended
98for consumer use. Where a labeling requirement for a product
has been established by the agency, the act prohibits states from es-
tablishing or continuing in effect any requirement not "identicalS99
to" the federal labeling requirement. Both federal and state
courts have consistently held that, where the labeling on a product
subject to the act complies with federal requirements, all failure-to-
warn claims relating to the content or sufficiency of the label are
preempted. 00 However, claims for product defect (including de-
sign and manufacture claims) which are not label-based are not
preempted, as are failure-to-warn claims charging non-compliance
with the applicable federal requirements.''
G. Hazardous Substances Used In The Workplace
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, Congress
delegated to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
the authority to establish federal health and safety standards for the
protection of employees in their workplaces.' 2 The act contains
general provisions establishing the primacy of federal occupational
safety and health standards and the necessity of federal approval of
state plans10 3 and a specific savings clause declaring that "common
law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and em-
ployees... with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees
arising out of, or in the course of, employment" are unaffected by
the act.104 The act does not, however, contain a specific preemp-
tion clause similar to many of those described above.
Injured employees' product liability claims against manufac-
turers or suppliers of allegedly defective products used in the
workplace have been held not to be preempted by the act itself.
105
98. Hazardous Substance Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1262 (2000).
99. Id.. § 1261, note (b).
100. Comeaux v. National Tea Co., 81 F.3d 42, 42 (5th Cir. 1996); Moss v.
Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 740 (4th Cir. 1993); Lee v. Boyle-Midway Household
Prod. Inc., 792 F.Supp. 1001, 1009 (W.D. Pa. 1992); Busch v. Graphic Color Corp.,
662 N.E.2d 397, 408-09 (Ill. 1996); Canty v. Ever-Last Supply Co., 685 A.2d 1365,
1374 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996); Jenkins v. James B. Day & Co., 634 N.E.2d
998, 1004 (Ohio 1994).
101. Canty, 685 A.2d at 1379.
102. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (b)(3) (2000).
103. Id. § 667 (b).
104. Id. § 653(b) (4).
105. See, e.g., Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 53-54 (1st Cir. 1991); York v.
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However, in a comprehensive federal standard governing the
evaluation and communication of hazards arising out of workplace
chemical use, 1 0 S H A stated its intent to "preempt any legal re-
quirements of a state.. .pertaining to [evaluation and communica-
tion of chemical hazards to employees]."' 0' OSHA further prohib-
ited states from adopting or enforcing "any requirement" relating
to chemical safety addressed by the OSH1A standard, "except pursu-
ant to a Federally-approved state plan. ' ' The language of the act
itself, however, remained unchanged.
At least one federal circuit has held that the OSHA rule pre-
empts failure-to-warn claims against the manufacturer of an alleged
injury-causing workplace chemical, so long as the labeling on the
chemical's container satisfied OSHA requirements. 0 9 Another fed-
eral court, without deciding the broader issue, held that product
liability claims alleging the chemical manufacturer's non-
compliance with the OSHA standard are not preempted."l 0
H. Flammable Fabrics
In the Flammable Fabrics Act, Congress authorized the Con-
sumer Products Safety Commission to research and develop testing
standards for the flammability of materials and fabrics."' As
amended in 1976, the act also bars states from establishing or con-
tinuing in effect any "flammability standard or other regulation"
which is not "identical to" a federally-established flammability stan-
dard or regulation for the fabric or material at issue.'1
Generally speaking, both federal and state courts have de-
clined to preempt state product liability claims arising from flam-
mable fabrics. Interpreting a prior version of the act's preemption
clause, the First Circuit held that the act did not bar states, through
Union Carbide Corp., 586 N.E.2d 861, 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
106. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (a)(1)-(2) (2000).
107. Id. § 1910.1200(a) (2).
108. Id.
109. Torres-Rios v. LPS Lab., Inc., 152 F.3d 11, 16 (lst Cir. 1998). Notably,
nowhere in its opinion did the First Circuit mention its prior opinion in Pedraza
which was based in part upon the act's savings clause. The continued vitality of
Pedraza and the possible impact of Geier upon this decision, are both unclear at
best.
110. Wickham v. Am. Tokyo Kasei, Inc., 927 F.Supp. 293, 295 (N.D. I11. 1996).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1201 (b) (1)-(4) (1997).
112. Id. § 1203 (a).
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the course of common-law tort actions, from enacting more strin-
gent standards than those set by federal law for fabric flammabil-
ity." 3 In a subsequent ruling construing the act's current language,
the First Circuit again declined to preempt state tort claims on the
grounds that the phrase "flammability standard or other regula-
tion" does not reach state common-law tort actions." 4 State courts
have reached similar results.1
5
I. Miscellaneous Consumer Products
Finally, manufacturers of certain products falling within the
purview of the Consumer Product Safety Act 16 (hereinafter
"CPSC") have also sought the benefit of the preemption defense in
product liability actions. The act prohibits states from establishing
or continuing in effect "any provision of a safety standard or regula-
tion which prescribes any requirements as to the performance,
composition, contents, design, finish, construction, packaging, or
labeling of such product which are designed to deal with the same
risk of injury associated with such consumer product, unless such
requirements are identical to the requirements of the Federal stan-
dard.". However, the act also contains a savings clause providing
that "[c]ompliance with consumer product safety rules or other
rules or orders under this Act shall not relieve any person from li-
abili at common law or under State statutory law to any other per-
son."
Lawnmowers are both subject to a variety of CPSC require-
ments" 9 and a frequent subject of product liability litigation. In
one such action, failure-to-warn claims relating to a mower label's
warning of injuries to the fingers from the mower blade were held
to be expressly preempted, inasmuch as a specific federal safety
standard prescribed the content for the label and the label con-
113. Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1028 (1st Cir. 1973).
114. Wilson v. Bradlees of New England, Inc., 96 F.3d 552, 553 (lst Cir. 1996).
115. O'Donnell v. Big Yank, Inc., 696 A.2d 846, 853 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
116. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (1997) (describing the purpose of the Act).
117. Id. § 2075(a).
118. Id. § 2074(a).
119. For example, each mower must have a blade control system that permits
the blade to rotate only if the operator presses on a special control on the handle.
16 C.F.R. § 1205.5(a) (1) (i) (2000). Each mower must also pass a "foot probe" test,
which effectively mandates that a protective shield be installed extending from the
blade housing. Id. § 1205.5(a) (iv) (B).
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formed to that standard; however, defective design claims, in the
absence of a federal standard regulating lawnmower design, were••120
allowed to proceed to trial. In another case, where the CPSC
proposed but then withdrew a safety standard which would have
required the use of "no-mow-in-reverse" devices on lawn mowers,
design defect claims based upon the absence of such a device were
allowed to stand.
21
V. HARMONIZING DISPARATE PREEMPTION RESULTS
Given that all federal preemption springs from a single clause
in the United States Constitution, at one level the variability and
inconsistency of the courts' application of the preemption defense
in product liability actions are remarkable. As illustrated above,
some products are covered by a federal preemption defense; others
are not. In some settings, federal and state courts have construed
the same express preemption scheme completely oppositely from
one another; in others, such as cases involving medical devices after
Medtronic, the federal courts appear to be confused and divided
among themselves. The term "standards," when used in the con-
text of boat safety, encompasses duties imposed by state tort law;
when used in the context of flammable fabrics, "standards" does
not reach state product liability claims; and, exactly what "safety
standards" means for purposes of motor vehicle safety is anyone's
guess. Standards considered but not implemented by the federal
government for boat propeller guards may still be entitled to pre-
emptive effect; unadopted or invalid "standards" for tractor-trailer
braking systems or lawnmowers do not preempt state tort claims.
Even four members of the Supreme Court apparently believe that
the term "requirements," when used in different preemption stat-
utes governing different products, can carry different meanings in
each.
There is no single, or simple, explanation to these inconsisten-
cies. However, notions of federalism, uniformity of standards, ac-
cess to the courts, and politics aid in understanding why such
120. Moe v. MTD Prod., Inc., 73 F.3d 179, 182 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 2075 (a); 16 C.F.R. § 1205.5 (a)).
121. Johnston v. Deere & Co., 967 F.Supp. 574, 574 (D. Me. 1997).
122. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487-90 (1996). Justice Stevens' plu-
rality opinion discusses the term "requirements" as contained in both the Medical
Device Amendments and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. Id.
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clearly disparate results have arisen and are likely to pervade prod-
uct liability law for the foreseeable future.
That state courts have tended to be less preemption-friendly
than federal courts should come as no surprise. Most if not all state
constitutions assure, at least in theory, the right of individuals al-
legedly aggrieved by another to seek redress in the courts."' Par-
ticularly where federal and not state law preempts otherwise-
applicable state remedies, state judges are often reluctant to divest
aggrieved plaintiffs of their day in court.124 By contrast, because
federal courts are of limited jurisdiction and are more experienced
in adjudicating questions of federal supremacy, federal courts may
be less concerned than state courts about the practical implicationsS 125
of the preemption defense.
Also inherent in preemption of product liability claims is a
fundamental tension between federalism and uniformity. The
United States Constitution expressly reserves to the states all powers
not expressly delegated to the federal government. 126 Compensat-
ing persons injured in their persons or property by defective prod-
ucts has long been viewed as a local, not federal, concern reserved
to the states under their police powers. 12 Conversely, particularly
as many product manufacturers' markets for their goods expand
from local to national (and even global) in nature, Congress has
increasingly recognized a need for uniform national standards, 12
and industries worldwide have adopted voluntary global standards129
for the design, manufacture and distribution of certain goods.
123. E.g., MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
124. As the Minnesota Court of Appeals observed in Brandt v. Marshall Animal
Clinic, 540 N.W.2d 870, 878 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) "[i]t is worthy of note
that ... the trial court below expressed concern and regret for the remedies lost
by preemption.... We are mindful of these concerns."
125. This is not to say that federal judges are unsympathetic to the same con-
cerns. E.g., Murphy v. SmithKline Beecham Animal Health Group,, 898 F.Supp.
811, 818 (D. Kans. 1995) (stating "[t]he court regrets the fact that its decision
leaves the plaintiff without a remedy at law"); Lynnbrook Farms v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 887 F.Supp. 1100, 1106 (C.D. Ill.), aff'd 79 F.3d 620 (7th Cir.
1996) (stating "[a]ll this being said, the Court is troubled by the absence of a fed-
eral remedy").
126. U. S. CONST. amend. X.
127. Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
719 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985).
128. E.g., supra note 91 and accompanying text.
129. E.g., International Organization for Standardization, International Stan-
dard (ISO) 9000.
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The tension between these competing considerations was viv-
idly illustrated in 1999, when legislation designed to limit the ability
of both Congress and federal agencies to preempt state and local
laws and regulations was introduced in both houses of Congress.
3
0
The legislation was sponsored by an unusual alliance between con-
servative Republican advocates of states' rights and liberal Democ-
rats interested in enhancing environmental protection through
more stringent state laws. However, business groups were opposed
to the legislation, claiming that it would subject businesses of all
types to a patchwork of differing state standards for their goods and
services.13 1 Ultimately, the business point of view prevailed and the
proposed legislation was dropped-at least for the time being.
132
The Executive Branch has also recently weighed in on the pre-
emption issue. As the proposed legislation described above was
winding its way through Congress, President Clinton issued an Ex-
ecutive Order which, under the guise of federalism promotion,
generally precludes federal agencies from preempting state and lo-
cal law except when Congress has manifested some specific pre-• . 133
emptive intent. Because the Executive Order contains language
expressly disavowing any intent "to create any right or benefit, sub-
stantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against.., any
person, 134 it would appear to offer no protection to product liabil-
ity plaintiffs seeking to avoid the impact of express agency preemp-
tion. 
135
Finally, even where Congress has spoken to the question of
preemption, federal agencies are free to, and often do, offer their
interpretation of the proper scope of preemption of state tort
claims involving the products they regulate. Those positions, and
130. S. Rep. No. 106-159, at 1 (1999).
131. Cindy Skrzycki, The Chamber Reached A Sticking Point, WASHINGTON POST,
September 17, 1999, at El.
132. Id.
133. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (1999). The Order essen-
tially restates an earlier proclamation on the same subject by President Reagan.
Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987).
134. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (1999).
135. Murphy v. SmithKline Beecham Animal Health Group, 898 F. Supp. 811,
815 (D. Kan. 1995). But cf. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., _ U.S.__ ,120 S.
Ct. 1913, 1940 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing the general existence of
Executive Orders 12,612 and 13,132 and their impact upon agencies intending to
preempt state law, but making no mention of the "no private right" language in
those Orders).
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the courts' treatment of them, can vary widely among different
agencies. For example, the FDA has repeatedly expressed its intent
that preemption of state tort actions seeking damages for defective
medical devices and other products under its regulatory control
should, at most, occur in very limited situations. 136 In Medtronic, as
noted previously, the Supreme Court placed controlling weight
upon the FDA's interpretation of the preemption clause in the
Medical Device Amendments, as opposed to the literal language of
the statute itself. 3  Similarly, after years of silence following the
Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone and the holdings of numer-
ous federal and state courts upholding preemption of product la-
beling-related claims under FIFRA, in 1999 the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency submitted amicus briefs in two cases urging the
courts to find that FIFRA's preemption clause does not preempt
state tort law, or at a minimum state failure-to-warn claims relating
to product efficacy. 18 In neither case, however, did the court ac-
cept EPA's position. 139 Conversely, in Geier, the Department of
Transportation expressed its position through an amicus brief that
the plaintiffs "no airbag" defective design claim stood "as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution" of the objectives under-
lying Standard 208 and should be preempted via conflict; the Su-
preme Court placed considerable weight upon the agency's views
on preemption. 40  And on no less than two separate occasions,
APHIS has formally announced that, in construing its declaration
of preemption to bar most state tort claims for harm caused by al-
legedly-defective animal vaccines, the courts' determination of the
scope of APHIS' preemptive intent was correct.141
136. Bansemer v. Smith Laboratories, Inc., No. CIV.A. 86-C-1313, 1990 WL
132579, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 12, 1988) (discussing FDA's intent that failure-to-
warn claims arising out of pharmaceutical labeling should not be preempted).
137. Id.
138. Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2000); Etcheverry v. Tri-
Ag Serv., 993 P.2d 366, 375 (Cal. 2000).
139. In Etcheverry, the California Supreme Court flatly rejected the position of-
fered by EPA as amicus. In Hart, by contrast, the Fifth Circuit did not reach the
merits of EPA's position but instead decided the appeal on jurisdictional grounds.
140. Geier, 120 S.Ct. at 1926.
141. Symens v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 152 F.3d 1050, 1055 n.2 (8th Cir.
1998); Lynnbrook Farms v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 79 F.3d 620, 629-30 (7th
Cir. 1996). Notably, these affirmations came in the face of significant political
pressure upon APHIS, brought by a United States Senator, to declare the opposite
- that the courts' decisions did not correctly reflect agency intent. Garrelts v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 943 F.Supp. 1023, 1031-32 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
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VI. WHERE Is THE PREEMPTION DEFENSE HEADED?
In light of the foregoing, what does the future hold in store for
federal preemption of product liability actions? Allow us to offer a
few semi-informed prognostications.
First, in the absence of either (1) national product liability leg-
islation supplanting all federal preemption schemes or (2) the Su-
preme Court's overruling of Cipollone, federal preemption of state
product liability actions will continue to yield inconsistent and in
many cases inexplicable results. As the statutory language, agency
intent, degree of federal regulation and other factors vary from
product to product, so, too, will the outcomes reached by the
courts. Uniformity and consistency will largely be absent.
Second, the trend toward uniform national, indeed uniform
global, standards governing the conduct of American product
manufacturers (not to mention providers of financial services and
other industries) will continue if not accelerate. Many businesses
already require their suppliers to conform to international stan-
dards of product design, manufacture, labeling and testing; those
numbers will likely grow. In addition, regional or global trade
agreements can have the effect of displacing state or local regula-
tion determined to unfairly affect trading partners. 142 The growing
pressure towards national and global uniformity will likely cause an
increase in calls for protection from state and local requirements
that detract from uniformity.
Third, the preemption defense is almost certain to remain
highly politicized. Product manufacturers, desirous of greater pro-
tection from tort litigation, can be expected to lobby both Congress
and federal agencies in the hope of securing (or at least preserv-
ing) federal preemption; those representing victims of allegedly de-
fective products will likely lobby Congress and federal agencies for
abolition (or at least limitation) of express preemption clauses.
These battles will likely be fought on a product-by-product, statute-
by-statute basis. In addition, the federalism bills introduced in the
House and Senate in 1999 will likely be resurrected by federalism
142. For example, the World Trade Organization has ruled that a federal ban
on the importation of shrimp and shrimp products from nations not certified as
harvesting shrimp via techniques protective of sea turtles violates GATT. Pub. L.
No. 101-162, 103 Stat. 988, 16 U.S.C. § 1537 note (2000).
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advocates in future years and, depending upon which party then
controls Congress, may well meet with more success. Similarly,
state and local governments have largely sat on the sidelines as
Congress and federal agencies have whittled away at their tradi-
tional police powers; their strong support for the 1999 federalism
bills suggests that state and local governments may more aggres-
sively resist future federal attempts to displace state authority via
federal preemption.
Finally, look for federal agencies to play a greater role in the
preemption debate. While tort litigation may enhance product
safety and efficacy, it can also limit the availability of products in
certain markets and sharply increase the price consumers must pay
for them. Expert federal agencies, intimately familiar with the
products and industries they regulate, are arguably far better suited
than Congress to balance these conflicts and to ascertain the de-
gree of federal uniformity necessary to assure safety, efficacy and
availability at a reasonable cost. Where Congress has not foreclosed
federal agencies from resorting to preemption as a regulatory tool,
one should not be surprised to see agencies wield that tool with in-
creasing frequency as circumstances dictate the need for federal
exclusivity and uniformity in appropriate areas. And as both Med-
tronic and Geier illustrate, even where Congress has spoken to the
question of preemption, the Supreme Court will still place consid-
erable emphasis upon an agency's interpretation of Congress' lan-
guage and its "fair and considered judgment" as to whether pre-
143emption should lie. The door is wide open for federal agencies
to exert far greater influence on the preemption question.
143. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1997), quoted in Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., Inc., - U.S. _ ,120 S. Ct. 1913, 1927 (2000).
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